Napoleonic SPANISH: A revising opinion.

It only just occurred to me that neither my good mate Grant, Matt nor I have any Spanish figures at all to speak of. So what? Well, we've been playing Napoloeonic Iberian Peninsular wargames for over 20 years and the nearest I can come is one unit of Portuguese Cacadores ... not very near. I feel this is a problem.

I have no plans to begin supplementing my Peninsular army with Spanish figures any time soon, but will one day for their uniforms alone. But why is it that to date I have had no genuine leanings in this direction? How is it that my British army collection continues to exclude the locals across whose country they fought? I suspect the reason might be that focusing so closely on the armies of Wellesley (later Wellington) I have been groomed to dismiss just about everyone else. I too was hugely influenced by Bernard Cornwell's Sharpe series of novels and then the TV adaptations. Through this retelling of the campaigns from 1810 to 1815, the Spanish soldiery is regularly dismissed as being useless.

What I am exploring is how accurate or justified the 'received' reputation of their armies' are in the English speaking histories (my primary sources) as it filters into public memory. Negative anecdotes are perpetuated by novelists, in drama and amongst wargamer 'histories' - Warlord Games describing them as little better than an 'armed mob.' In short, my reading over the decades has the Spanish military reputation being a very poor one. Is this what we all understand to be the case? In this, I am very welcoming of any input you might like to make and invite comments.

What strikes me initially (and I don't think this can be emphasized enough) is that the Spanish found themselves providing vast military support initially to the French and then the British, neither of whom were ever genuine friends of Spain or a natural ally. A cursory glance at the wider history of Spain and the Spanish Empire which preceded this period, see's them in an almost constant opposition to the interests of Britain or France. This consideration affects how they would operate alongside either allied army in the field and politically. Conversely, it affects the attitude and commentary of their 'allies' when we read reports on Spanish failures.

The people of Spain found themselves unwilling hosts to foreign armies as their homeland was turned into an ongoing theatre of war. Desperate soldiers of all flags were prone to looting and far worse - too often the locals were cruelly treated. They imposed themselves on a powerless population through billets, garrisons and consumed resources the agrarian economy could ill afford. We all know of the privations caused by the foraging policy of the French army on the march but consider also the British system of alleged purchase for supply.

Many within the British Commissariat indulged in bribery, extortion and blatant personal profiteering. Yes, the British army paid for it's goods but at a price of no advantage to the locals who were compelled to 'sell' whether they could afford to or not. Better than the French to be sure - but by a margin only.

Most of us who have an abiding historical interest in the Peninsular War (1808-14) are aware of the deep cultural divide between the French and the Spanish and between the British and the Spanish. The transition of the British Isles toward Protestantism and the French revolutionary rejection of Catholicism set the traditional and deeply conservative Spanish far apart. Politically, the French had abandoned absolute monarchy and settled for a new monarchical rule with vestiges of the revolutionary meritocracy. The British governed themselves through a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary system formed through a proto-democracy ... albeit a rotten one with a hundred years of reform ahead of it. Compared this then to the subject Spanish peoples, ruled by an aristocracy with an almost inseparable union of church and state - we can see three worlds set apart.

The land mass of Spain is over twice that of Britain and is criss-crossed with mountain ranges, valleys and plains which lends itself to cultural regionalization. What we call the 'Spanish' language is essentially Catalonian and there are multiple other dialects. Considering that whilst other European countries to their north had divided themselves through the protestant reformation, the powers in Spain had for hundreds of years fought to expel the Muslim control and culture from Andalusia - entrenching a united Church and state whilst doing so. I think it fair to observe that there were many Spains to be found once central authority was lost.

Another event also might throw some perspective on deep seated animosities which existed between the British and Spanish soldiers themselves. I think many of us would be familiar with the events of Badajoz by British forces in 1812. To recap briefly, the siege was hotly contested at considerable cost in lives to the attacking British army who, after entering the city ran riot looting, raping and murdering the civilian population. I've read many academic and other defences of this act (principally English commentators) and I think many of us are aware of the ancient tenet concerning failure to capitulate past a certain point in a siege (the ram has touched the wall).

Those who are more comfortable excusing acts through the total war theory easily dismiss the atrocity but we should at least consider that the inhabitants were Spanish civilians - not French. They were not the enemy and had no control over their situation. Consider the prevailing attitude British soldiers must have had toward Spaniards in general. Consider then also the affect this had on Anglo-Spanish relations within the armies and on the field?

If I were Spanish at the time, I'd be wondering what sort of 'friend' this new British ally was ... not a very friendly one. So, just how far would you go to risk life and limb fighting alongside these redcoats when fighting against the French? I'd be thinking about letting my allies and my enemy do most of the fighting and let them kill each other. Taking this perspective, failure to support an attack looks a lot less like cowardice or incompetence.

Whilst the Spanish had defeated the French in the field it's undeniable that they were more often outclassed by French skill at arms - but then so was everyone else for quite some time. The Prussians, the Russians and the Austrians  were comprehensively defeated time and again but don't seem to suffer the same reputation as their Spanish counterparts. Why is this? Even the British army failed in Flanders and were driven out of Spain the first time at Corunna (1809). Everyone had a come-back and victory over the French in the end - including the Spanish. Is the lasting impression of Spanish arms simply becasue we have derogatory British first hand accounts in a language I understand? If so, why so?

Just prior to allying with the British, the Spanish had been fighting against them - the more traditional arrangement. Actions between the two protagonists hadn't been entirely uneven and British raids had been repulsed at Cadiz, Tenerife and Ferrol so they could certainly stand and put up a fight. Whilst the alliances had shifted, the British themselves were not overly fond of people they traditionally fought against. In British historical culture Francis Drake is lionized and the defeat of the Spanish Armadas had long been remembered and heralded. The average Englishman or Brit referred to Spanish as the 'Dons' or 'Dagos'. I don't know what Spanish soldiers called the British but it's bound to have been as equally insulting. But what of the wider Spanish effort against the French?

A glance at the list of battles fought by the Spanish in the Peninsular war shows Spanish victories against the French at both Battles of the Bruch (1808) where they captured a French eagle, the sieges of Gerona and Saragossa (1808), the first battle of Valencia (1808) combat at Mengibar (1808), the Battle of Bailen (1808), battle of Valmaseda (1808), Miajadas (1809), Monzon (1809), Alcaniz (1809), combat near Santiago (1809), battle of river Oitaben (1809), co-victors at Talavera (1809), Tamames (1809), Labispal (1810), combat of Pla (1811), co-victors at Barossa (1811), co-victors at Albuera (1811), Benadides (1811), 1st cobat at river Orbigo (1811), Valleys of Cergadne (1811), 1st combat of Bornos (1811), siege of Astorga (1812), co-victors at Salamanca (1812), Bilbao (1812), siege of Tafalla (1813), combat of Lerin (1813), co-victors at Vittoria (1813), combat of La Salud (1813), captured Saragossa (1813), co-victors of combat of Yanzi (1813), co-victors at San Marcial (1813), co-victors at Toulouse (1814) and the battle of Barcelona (1814). I may even have missed more.

The vast majority of these victories by Regulars and Guerillas were not with the direct assistance or in the presence of the British. There was clearly a lot of fighting going on across the whole country. From a Spanish perspective, the single British army which probed in and out of Portugal for the first few years was not even the main event but the English speaking world focuses on it. It took time before efforts combined properly and centralized with Wellesley becoming Generalissimo. When they combined we then have events such as the taking of Astorga which saw strong Spanish regular forces undertake successful siege operations whist also detaching troops to reinforce the Anglo-Portuguese at Salamanca. 

The victory at the battle of Bailen (1808) was in fact the first 'field' defeat of an French Napoleonic army. Not nearly all of the Spanish actions against the French involved the British whilst some operations complimented their allies in a grand tactical manner. The Spanish had more than their fair share of losses with significant consequences but I think we can safely say it was far from a one way affair.

So, why are our accounts so critical? I suspect it's down to prejudice born of the times. The accounts handed down to us are from literate witnesses from within a defining class structure. As an Australian born in the second half of the 20th century it's difficult to appreciate at times what a rigid class structure meant and how it directed behaviour. I think it's fair to say that a class structure tended to induce all too often a disdain amongst one group in a society for another - resentment being directed upwards and contempt downwards. The militaries doubled-down on this through their officer ranks and purchase systems.

Pride and honour with social and military status manifested itself in public behaviour and even duels (an extreme) and tended toward critical commentary through the correspondence of the literate elites. I don't mean to keep singling out Arthur Wellesley except his commentaries are so well known.  I've written before about his dismissive attitude toward the Dutch in 1815 but he is also on record for deriding his own cavalry and he was contemptuous toward the artillery - the two arms of service of whom he was least familiar. No surprised that the future Duke of Wellington was from the infantry himself and remained critical of the 'other'. Criticism of others for men of the officer class seems very much the way of things. Whilst very critical himself, Wellesley labelled in turn his critics as 'croackers.' It was all the rage.

A real problem with letters and memoirs is that the author can write what they want, to whom they want with little regard for the truth. Neither types of correspondence are accountable and are as prone to exaggeration or twisting of the truth as a veteran telling tall tales in a pub for free drinks. So, when we have an account of a Spanish infantry unit fleeing a battle after their own first volley, we might pause to consider what the attitude of the author might have been in the first instance.

I suspect the demeanor of the rank and file of the allied armies might also have been quite different. The Spanish had larger forces spread across the whole of Spain engaging in multiple areas of operation. They drew from their own populace in defence of their own homeland and for them this was a war of liberation. To a larger degree, the Spanish armies were comprised of a good number of what we might call citizen soldiery - enlisted for the cause and for the duration of the conflict. Compare them then with the British.

The British regular army comprised volunteers and pressed men to some degree who were serving for the King's Shilling in foreign parts to prosecute the interests of King and empire. The 'scum of the earth' were kept in line at times with the lash and the occasional hanging. Life was hard and so too were the men in scarlet. It's hard not to imagine the average British soldier as a hard-bitten, cynic ... suspicious, fatalistic and critical of everyone else who wasn't of his ranks. They must have been prepared for the worst and tended to think the worst of their Spanish allies who needed their help.

I think it safe to say that the war was from far from over just becasue Wellesley and the British arrived. The forces deployed into Spain by the French were vast. We all know the oft emphasized Spanish Guerilla war but it was more than that. Spain, or rather the Spanish never rolled over. The central polity fractured under French occupation and each piece continued to resist and so too did the Spanish regular armies. Sometimes they might diffuse after defeat or in the face of overwhelming odds only to reform elsewhere. Spain was big enough for Spanish armies to retreat deeper into it. The battles continued to rage across four years until, facing exhaustion on too many fronts, The French could no longer recover from losses in the field against Wellington. They were also losing against the Spanish who were fighting alongside him and elsewhere.

I feel that far too much credit has been taken from the Spanish at the time by personalities not prepared to share the glory. This myopia has been repeated down the generations and goes on to this day. At least this is my current appreciation ... what's yours?